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Abstract
The paper de*nes formal methods (FMs) and describes economic issues involved in their
application. From these considerations and the concepts implicit in “No Silver Bullet”, it becomes
clear that FMs are best applied during requirements engineering. A explanation of why FMs work
when they work is o2ered and it is suggested that FMs help the most when the applier is most
ignorant about the problem domain. c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This paper is something that I have been meaning to write for some time now. I
have been giving a talk whose title is that of this paper to a variety of audiences. In
each case, the discussion generated was interesting and supplied more material for the
ever growing talk. When I received the invitation to attend the Monterey Workshop on
Engineering Automation for Computer-Based Systems, I saw an opportunity to present
the talk to an audience of almost entirely formal methods (FMs) people, including
some of the pioneers. The talk was much better received than I thought it might be
given its controversial nature. Moreover, all speaking participants at the workshop were
required to produce a paper for the proceedings. The paper that I wanted to write is
the result.
Because the paper represents more my personal opinion rather than some rigor-
ously established scienti*c conclusion, the paper uses *rst person when referring to the
author.
I have bene*ted particularly from an electronic discussion in 1995 with Martin
Feather.
With apologies to James H. Fetzer [15].
1 On sabbatical leave from Computer Science Department, Technion, Haifa 32000, Israel, with part of
work done at GMD FIRST, Rudower Chaussee 5, 12489 Berlin, Germany.
0167-6423/02/$ - see front matter c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1.1. Author’s background
My current area of research is Requirements Engineering (RE) [4]. The focus of
this area is on how to get requirements for software-intensive computer-based systems
(SWICBSs). It is now recognized, as is explained in the body of this paper, that
determining the requirements for SWICBSs is the hardest part of their development,
and diFculties in determining these requirements are the source of a vast majority
of errors found in delivered SWICBSs. The RE area is interested in understanding
why a method of determining requirements works when it does and why a method of
determining requirements fails when it does.
1.2. Outline of the paper
This paper starts of with a brief de*nition of FMs. It then gives some feeling for the
economics of applying FMs to the development of SWICBSs. Fred Brooks’s observa-
tion of “No Silver Bullet” is recalled for what it says about the diFculty of determining
SWICBS requirements. The paper o2ers that the most useful time to apply FMs is in
the requirements engineering phase of SWICBS development. Not all applications of
FMs lead to high-quality SWICBSs. However, when they do succeed, there appear to
be two factors working for that success, the second time phenomenon and qualities of
the people who push for and engage in FMs.
So as not to lose readers who believe in FMs and who see parts of this paper as
arguing against their use, please consider that I believe in FMs and use them when
appropriate. I used to work for a company that sells FM technology and applies FM
to clients’ SWICBS development problems, including for secure operating systems.
Moreover, I did some fundamental work on the underlying theory of one FM a long
time ago [1]. The reader will see that I am generally in favor of FMs, but there are
serious problems of which we must be aware. The paper o2ers some unconventional
ideas as to why FMs are successful when they are.
2. Denitions of FMs
Basically, an FM is any attempt to use mathematics in the development of an
SWICBS, in order to improve the quality of the resulting SWICBS. For the purpose
of this paper, I am trying to include in the realm of FMs anything anyone working in
FM claims is an FM. If I have neglected to include one, my apologies. Please inform
me by e-mail and include a reference to literature about it. For fuller discussions, see
the papers by Hall [21], Leveson [25] and Wing [29], and papers cited therein.
There are three main groups of FMs, veri*cation, intensive mathematical study of
key problem, and refutation. Each group is described; its strengths, weaknesses and
costs are considered.
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Table 1
1 P↔C Formal speci*cation of requirements
2 P↔C Veri*cation of consistency and basic correctness of requirements speci*cation
3 P↔C Formal speci*cation of design
4 P↔C Veri*cation of consistency of requirements and design speci*cations
5 P↔C Formal speci*cation of code
6 P↔C Veri*cation of consistency of (requirements), design, and code speci*cations
7 C Code
8 P↔C Veri*cation of consistency of (requirements, design, and) code speci*cations and the code
2.1. Veri2cation
The *rst group of FMs are those that attempt to provide a basis by which the software
of an SWICBS can be formally proved to be a correct realization of a speci*cation
embodying its requirements. Strictly speaking, the code is proved consistent with a
formal speci*cation. Rarely, however, is the full proof carried out. Nevertheless, the
FMs in this group all have as their goal the production of at least one part of a
full proof of correctness. Within this group, there are many levels of formality and
completeness. Here, by “completeness” is meant that of application and not that of a
mathematical theory. Some of the FMs of this group can be characterized as some
collection of levels of Table 1. In this table, the notation “P↔C” means “partial
through complete”, “C” means “complete”, and “P” means “partial”.
In each veri*cation level, the items in parentheses are included in what is veri*ed
to be consistent by virtue of transitivity provided by lower level proofs. Only the
items outside the parentheses are directly involved in that level’s proof. In Level 2,
“basic correctness” means veri*cation that the requirements speci*cation satis*es any
available independent speci*cation of the correctness criterion, e.g., security.
A typical FM in the group described by Table 1 consists of some collection of
levels. Sometimes only Levels 1 and 7 are carried out with no veri*cation. Rather,
the doing of the formal speci*cation allows much to be learned about the SWICBS to
be developed before carrying out the actual development. Much more is learned this
way than when only an informal, natural language speci*cation is written. Sometimes
only Level 1 is carried out for the purpose of documenting the requirements of the
SWICBS, on the grounds that a formal speci*cation is the most precise.
Applying FMs of this group drives up the cost of SWICBS development as high
as 2 fold over applying normal systematic methods of writing just the code if only
Levels 1 and 7 are carried out, 10 fold if Levels 1–4 and then 7 are carried out, and
even higher if more veri*cation is carried out. These are the rules of thumb that were
applied in the company mentioned above that sold FM technology.
2.2. Intensive study of key problems
The second group of FMs are the intensive mathematical study of one or more dif-
*cult aspects of the SWICBS, as shown in Table 2. These are an attempt to avoid
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Table 2
1 C Study of one diFcult aspect of requirements e.g., security, safety
2 C Study of one diFcult aspect of design
3 C Study of one diFcult aspect of code
the heavy costs of the veri*cation FMs. Rather than specifying the entire SWICBS,
only the diFcult or problematic parts of the SWICBS are considered. For example,
if the job is to build a secure operating system that guarantees that only authorized
users gain access to any speci*c *le, instead of specifying the whole operating sys-
tem and proving its security, one could focus on the security-relevant portion of the
system at the speci*cation, design, or code level, or at some combination of these.
While this focusing is considerably cheaper than dealing with the full system, it is
fraught with a serious danger of overlooking something that is security relevant. One
cannot be certain that the ignored portions of the system are not security relevant,
that they do not impact and they are not impacted by the parts designated as security
relevant and therefore under study. To prove that the ignored parts are not security
relevant turns the FM into a costly veri*cation. Nevertheless, as one gets experience
with a class of applications, he or she becomes more certain about what can safely be
ignored.
I would classify into this group any development in which theoretical knowledge
is used to make the development of a program more systematic. The most common
example of this phenomenon is compiler writing, which borrows heavily on the theory
of phrase-structure grammars and has spawned its own collection of theory.
The rules of thumb that I have heard are that these intensive study FMs drive the
development cost up from 2 to 5 fold, depending on the complexity of the problem
and depending on how many levels of the study are carried out.
2.3. Refutation
The elements of the third group of FMs take an entirely di2erent approach, that
of refutation rather than veri*cation [27], that is, instead of trying to prove that the
SWICBS meets its requirements, one tries to refute the claim that it does. The ad-
vantage is that the correctness claim can be refuted by one counter example, while a
proof must consider all possible cases. There are two kinds of refutation. One kind
are those based on computable properties of some speci*cation of the SWICBS. The
second kind are those based on execution of some speci*cation of the SWICBS on test
data. Note that neither of these can be veri*cation of correctness; correctness is not
a computable property, and testing can be used to show the presence of errors, never
their absence [11].
Given a speci*cation of the complete SWICBS, as in Level 1 of the veri*cation
group of FMs, two examples of computable properties that can be used to refute the
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claim of correctness are:
• type checking in the speci*cation;
• cross-reference checking in the speci*cation.
A type error, unde*ned identi*er, or de*ned, but unused identi*er can be the symptom
of a more serious error, which a thinking human being should be able to spot given
the evidence.
Given a speci*cation of the complete SWICBS, as in Level 1 of the veri*cation
group of FMs, if the language of the speci*cation is executable, e.g., OBJ [19] or
INATEST [23,13], one should be able to execute the speci*cation either with actual
data or symbolically. The execution with test data may show errors in the speci*ed
SWICBS. Alternatively, one might be able to build a *nite state model of the SWICBS,
either directly or by simplifying the model or abstracting away some of the complexity.
Execution of the *nite state model with test data can show errors. In addition, if the
model is *nite state, there are computable checks, e.g., reachability analysis, that can
be used to show the presence of problems. This group of activities is called model
checking.
While locating an error by refutation is not guaranteed, in practice, model checking
does expose errors, just as does execution of the *nished SWICBS. However, as is
shown in Section 5, it is highly preferable for an error to be exposed early in the life
cycle than later after deployment of the *nished SWICBS.
The refutation approaches cost that of Levels 1 and 7 of the veri*cation group plus
only 5–50% for the refutation. That is, refutation drives the cost of development up to
between 2.05 and 2.50 fold, and this is cheaper than with full veri*cation.
2.4. Programming itself as an FM
Remember that a program itself is a formal speci*cation. A programming language
is a formally de*ned language with precise semantics just like Z, in fact, even more
so than Z, which purposely leaves some things unde*ned. One could not prove the
consistency of speci*cations and code if code were not formal. Therefore, programming
itself is an FM in the sense that writing a formal speci*cation is an FM. Remember
that programming is building a theory from the programming language and library of
abstractions, i.e., the ground, up, just like making new mathematics.
2.5. General limitation of FMs
An ultimate problem with any of these FMs that are based on a speci*cation of the
SWICBS under design is the accuracy of this speci*cation. If it does not specify what
is desired, that is, it is not right, code that is consistent with this speci*cation does
not do what is desired. The speci*cation could be wrong for an error of commission
or an error of omission. The speci*cation could deal with a given situation in an
inappropriate way, e.g., shutting down an aircraft engine that is in an inconsistent
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state. The speci*cation could fail to deal with an issue entirely or could even fail to
detect the presence of the issue.
2.6. Economic realities of FMs
For most software, it is just not worth the cost to apply FMs; one can get more
than acceptable quality by inspection [14] for up to 15% more and absolutely superb
results by just doing the software twice at the cost of about 100% more. However, for
highly safety- and security-critical systems, for which the cost of failure is death or is
considered very high, FMs are necessary to achieve the required correctness and are
well worth the cost.
David Notkin [9] observes about model checking that sometimes it is necessary
to make simplifying assumptions in the model to get a model tractable enough to
be checked. This necessity creates a dilemma. Without simpli*cation, the speci*cation
cannot be analyzed and critical problems might be overlooked. However, simpli*cations
might hide critical problems, especially as abstraction is used to collapse a number of
states into one. In the end, it is an issue of costs. Which problems cost more, the ones
overlooked by lack of analysis or the ones overlooked by simpli*cation?
On the other hand, there is evidence that careful use of FMs during RE of an
SWICBS can eliminate enough errors from ever showing up later in the development of
the SWICBS, when they are very expensive to *x, that the cost of the later development
is reduced enough that the total cost of an FM-assisted development is no more or even
less than that of an unassisted development [21,22]. See Section 5 for more information
about the cost to *x errors as a function of the development stage in which they are
found.
3. Errors and requirements specications
One thing that has been learned over the years is that most errors are introduced into
SWICBSs during the requirements discovery, speci*cation, and documentation stages,
to the tune of between 65% and 85%. The coding stage introduces only about 25% of
the errors ever introduced into an SWICBS [6]. Veri*cation of the consistency of code
to speci*cation is by far the most expensive FM. Therefore, it is not clear how useful
code veri*cation is if only 25% of the errors are introduced during coding, and these
errors are probably the easiest to *x. It seems that it is more cost e2ective to spend
just 15% more for inspections than to spend more than 10 fold to *x errors introduced
during coding. Therefore, the focus of FMs must be on requirements.
4. No silver bullet (NSB)
Not so long ago, Fred Brooks observed that, with respect to software development,
“There’s no silver bullet” [8] that will suddenly and miraculously make programming
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fundamentally easier than it has been. He classi*es software diFculties into two groups,
the essence and the accidents. The essence of building software is devising the concep-
tual construct itself. This is very hard because the conceptual construct is of arbitrary
complexity, it must conform to the given real world, it constantly changes, and it is
ultimately invisible. On the other hand, most productivity gains have come from *xing
accidents. The accidents are the current technology that is used to develop the software.
Examples of such accidents and their solutions are:
• really awkward assembly language eliminated by high-level languages;
• severe time and space constraints eliminated by the introduction of big and fast
computers;
• long batch turnaround time eliminated by time-sharing operating systems and per-
sonal computers;
• tedious clerical tasks, for which tools are helpful, eliminated by those tools, such as
make, rcs, xref, spell, grep, fmt; and
• the drudgery of programming user interfaces eliminated by tools for building graphic
interfaces such as X Windows, Java, Visual Basic and other GUI libraries.
These have been signi*cant advances, and they have made coding signi*cantly easier
and less error prone. However, again, these advances attack only the minority of errors
introduced by coding and do nothing about the essence.
Unfortunately, the essence has resisted attack. We have the same sense of being
overwhelmed by the immensity of the problem and the seemingly endless details to
take care of, and we produce the same kind of brain-damaged SWICBSs that make
the same stupid kind of mistakes, as we did 30 years ago! The source of these errors
is that we just did not understand the conceptual construct that was to be constructed.
We overlooked details or have some details wrong.
5. FMs and the essence of software
Another way to describe the essence is “requirements”, not speci*cations, which are
just a statement of requirements, but the requirements themselves. FMs just do not
help identify requirements. They do not help us crack the essence.
There is a myth going around. Some FMs evangelists claim, “If only you had written
a formal speci*cation of the system, you wouldn’t be having these problems. Math-
ematical precision in the derivation of software eliminates imprecision”. Yes, formal
speci*cations are extremely useful in identifying inconsistencies in requirements speci*-
cations, especially if one carries out some minimal proofs of consistency and constraint
or invariant preservation. Interestingly, writing a program implementing the speci*ca-
tion also helps identify inconsistencies in the speci*cation; programming is another
FM.
Contrary to the claim of these evangelists, FMs do not *nd all gaps in understanding.
As Gordon and Bieman observe, omissions of functions are diFcult to recognize in
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Fig. 1. Cost to *x error as a function of detection stage.
formal speci*cations [20], just as they are in programs. von Neumann and Morgenstern
[28] say, “There’s no point to using exact methods where there’s no clarity in the
concepts and issues to which they are to be applied”.
Indeed, Oded Sudarsky, in a private discussion over co2ee, pointed out the phe-
nomenon of preservation of di9culty. Speci*cally, diFculties caused by lack of un-
derstanding of the real world situation are not eliminated by use of FMs; instead the
misunderstanding gets formalized into the speci*cations, and may even be harder to
recognize simply because formal de*nitions are harder to read by the clients. Sudarsky
adds that formal speci*cation methods just shift the lack of understanding from the im-
plementation phase to the speci*cation phase. The air-bubble-under-wallpaper metaphor
applies here; you press on the bubble in one place, and it pops up somewhere else.
FMs do have one positive e2ect, and it is a big one. Use of them increases the
correctness of the speci*cations. Therefore, you *nd more errors of commission at
speci*cation time than without them, saving considerable money for each bug found
earlier rather than later. Remember, the cost to repair an error goes up dramatically
as the project moves towards completion and beyond. Fig. 1 shows a graph relating
the relative cost to repair an error as a function of the SWICBS development stage
in which the error is found. Note that the cost scale on the y-axis is logarithmic, and
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Fig. 2. Percentage cost overrun as a function of study phase cost.
the graph itself looks exponential even on a logarithmic scale. It saves lots of money
to *nd errors earlier, and FMs help *nd errors earlier. However, these errors are of
commission rather than of omission.
In general, the more time spent studying the requirements, the easier it is to control
costs. The graph in Fig. 2, adapted from that by Forsberg and Mooz [16], plots data that
show dramatic reductions in cost overruns of 25 NASA projects as greater portions of
total project budgets are spent on the study phases. These projects include the Hubble
Space Telescope, Pioneer Venus, and Voyager. Clearly, after a longer study phase,
1. the requirements speci*cation is more complete and thus development encounters
fewer surprises that would delay the project completion,
2. it is easier to more accurately estimate the total resources needed for development;
or
3. both.
Another reason FMs do not help identify requirements very well is that requirements
always change—it is inherent in the software—and formalization requires freezing the
requirements long enough to write the speci*cation and carry out the veri*cations.
Meir Lehman identi*es concept of E-type system [24]. It is a system that solves a
problem or implements an application in some real world domain. Once installed, an
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Fig. 3. Distribution of kinds of maintenance.
E-type system becomes inextricably part of the application domain, so that it ends
up altering its own requirements. As an example, consider a bank that exercises an
option to automate its process and then discovers that it can handle more customers. It
advertises and gets new customers, easily handled by the new system but beyond the
capacity of the manual way. The bank cannot back out of automation. The requirements
of the system have changed from being just optional to being required. Also, daily use
of a system causes an irresistible ambition to improve it as users begin to suggest
improvements. Who is not familiar with this phenomenon, either as a customer or as a
developer? In fact, data show that most maintenance is not corrective, but for dealing
with E-type pressures! See Fig. 3. Formalization of the requirements does nothing to
make the details of these kinds of changes more predictable.
6. Second time phenomenon
In 1985, I published a paper with Jeannette Wing that suggests that FMs work,
not because of any inherent property of FMs as opposed to just plain programming,
which is really also an FM, but rather, because of the second time phenomenon [5]. If
you do anything a second time around you do better, because you have learned from
your mistakes the *rst time around. Indeed, Fred Brooks says: “Plan to throw one
[the *rst one] away; you will anyway!” [7]. In other words, you cannot get it right
until the second time. If you write a formal speci*cation and then you write code, you
have done the problem formally two times. Of course, the code will be better than if
you had not done the formal speci*cation. It is the second time! Note that writing an
informal speci*cation and then writing code does not have the same e2ect. It is too
easy to handwave and overlook details and thus fail to *nd the mistakes from which
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you learn. It has to be two formal developments, speci*cations or code, for the second
time phenomenon to work.
Observe how the two-time approach is requirements centered. One is not going to
*x implementation errors this way, because the second time is not the same imple-
mentation as the *rst time. Even if they were the same, one can introduce new errors
in the rewrite. The focus of the *rst speci*cation or coding e2ort is on understanding
the essence and eliminating requirements errors. The focus of the second is on im-
plementing the understood essence. As Euripedes says, “Second thoughts are always
wiser”.
7. The importance of ignorance
In a recent article, “Importance of Ignorance in Requirements Engineering” [2], I
report on my and Orna Berry’s experiences in practicing ignorance hiding [3] in re-
quirements engineering. I observed that I seem to do best when I am in fact most
ignorant of the problem domain. For example, I had been called in as a consultant
to help a start-up write requirements for a new multi-port Ethernet switching hub. I
protested that I knew nothing about networking and Ethernet beyond nearly daily use
of telnet, ftp, and net*nd. At one point, earlier in my life, I had worried that the ether
in Ethernet cables might evaporate! Despite my ignorance, I did a superb job, in fact,
better than I normally do in my areas of expertise. By being ignorant of the application
area, I was able to avoid falling into the tacit assumption tarpit. The experience seems
to con*rm the importance of the ignorance that ignorance hiding is so good at hiding.
It was clear to me that the main problems preventing the engineers at the start-up from
coming together to write a requirements document were that all were using the same
vocabulary in slightly di2erent ways, none was aware of any other’s tacit assumptions,
and each was wallowing deep in his own pit. My lack of assumptions forced me to
ferret out these assumptions and to regard the ever so slight di2erences in the uses of
some terms as inconsistencies.
My conclusion is that every requirements engineering team requires a person who is
ignorant in the application domain, the ignoramus of the team, who is not afraid to ask
questions that show his or her ignorance, and who will ask questions about anything
that is not entirely clear. It is not claimed that expertise is not needed. On the contrary,
experts are needed to provide the material in which to *nd inconsistencies. Also, there
is a di2erence between ignorance and stupidity; the ignoramus cannot be stupid. On
the contrary, he or she must be an expert in general software system structures and
how computer-based systems are built. He or she must be smart enough to catch
inconsistencies in statements made by experts in *elds other than his or her own,
inconsistencies in their tacit assumptions, to abstract well, and to get to the bottom of
things. Most importantly, he or she must be unafraid to ask so-called stupid questions
to expose all tacit assumptions. (This is part of smartness since usually stupid people
are afraid to ask stupid questions for fear of exposing their stupidity.)
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The *nal recommendation is that each requirements engineering team needs at least
one domain expert, usually supplied by the customer, and at least one smart ignoramus.
As a consequence of these observations, resumes of future software engineers will
have a section proudly listing all areas of ignorance. This is the only section of the
resume that shrinks over time. The software engineer will charge fees according to the
degree of ignorance: the more ignorance, the higher the fee!
Soon after publication of the Importance of Ignorance paper, I received an e-mail
letter from Martin Feather. He wrote,
I have often wondered about the success stories of applications of formal methods.
Should these successes be attributed to the formal methods themselves, or rather
to the intelligence and capabilities of the proponents of those methods? Typically,
proponents of any not-yet-popularised approach must be skilled practitioners and
evangelists to [help bring the approach] & : : : to our attention. Formal methods pro-
ponents seem to have the additional characteristic of being particularly adept at
getting to the heart of any problem, abstracting from extraneous details, carefully
organizing their whole approach to problem solving, etc. Surely, the involvement of
such people would be bene*cial to almost any project, whether or not they applied
“formal methods”.
Daniel Berry’s contribution to the February 1995 Controversy Corner, “The Im-
portance of Ignorance in Requirements Engineering”, provides further explanation
as to why this might be so. In that column, Berry expounded upon the bene*cial
e2ects of involving a “smart ignoramus” in the process of requirements engineering.
Berry argued that the “ignoramus” aspect (ignorance of the problem domain) was
advantageous because it tended to lead to the elicitation of tacit assumptions. He also
recommended that “smart” comprise (at least) “information hiding, and strong typing
& : : : attuned to spotting inconsistencies & : : : a good memory & : : : a good sense of
language & : : :”, so as to be able to e2ectively conduct the requirements process.
Formal methods people are usually mathematically inclined. They have, presum-
ably, spent a good deal of time studying mathematics. This ensures they meet both
of Berry’s criteria. Mastery of a non-trivial amount of mathematics ensures their
capacity and willingness to deal with abstractions, reason in a rigorous manner, etc.,
in other words to meet many of the characteristics of Berry’s “smartness” criterium.
Further, during the time they spent studying mathematics, they were avoiding learn-
ing about non-mathematics problem domains, hence they are likely to also belong
in Berry’s “ignoramus” category. Thus a background in formal methods serves as
a strong *lter, letting through only those who would be an asset to requirements
engineering.
8. Nature’s last laugh
Don Gause [17] points out that there are two kinds of people involved in the devel-
opment of any SWICBS, developers and customers. Each person divides the universe
D.M. Berry / Science of Computer Programming 42 (2002) 11–27 23
Fig. 4.
of discourse (UoD), the domain of the SWICBS, into two parts, what he or she knows
(K) and what he or she does not know (DK). The e2ect of these orthogonal partitions
of knowledge divides the UoD into four parts as is shown in Fig. 4. The problem
is that we do not know the size of the DKs. We like to think that after studying
the problem a long time, the DKs have been reduced to a tiny fraction of the Ks.
However, the DKs could be bigger than the Ks like the proverbial rest (as opposed
to the tip) of the iceberg. Even if, in fact, the DKs are small compared to the Ks,
the DKs can never be eliminated. The parts of the DKs that cannot be eliminated are
called “nature’s last laugh” by Don Gause. Examples of nature’s last laugh include
cold fusion and all previously accepted but now discredited theories of the universe.
The importance of the ignoramus comes through loud and clear. Every RE team
requires a smart ignoramus relative to the real world domain of the system under
design, who is not afraid to ask questions to reduce his or her DK in an attempt to
get his or her K to include the client’s and users’ K. He or she must not be stupid; in
fact, he or she must know enough about system architecture to be able to formulate
enough of a model to prompt the questions. Maybe this is the role of FMs, to increase
the Ks, but that is all it can be. It must be accepted that there will always be the DK,
nature’s last laugh that no one will *nd unless someone is lucky enough to ask the
right ignorant question.
9. Another experience
A complementary paper in this issue by David Robertson [26] considers how attempts
to use FMs in the early stages of SWICBS design can fail. He describes his experiences
trying to teach applied mathematicians to apply temporal logic to specifying a reactive
system. The experience is more evidence of the importance of ignorance in writing
speci*cations.
Robertson’s group was collaborating for the *rst time with a group of computer-
using applied mathematicians that knew temporal logic theory inside and out, but had
never applied this theory to specify any system. They were asked to specify in temporal
logic a domain that practically invited temporal speci*cation. As Robertson described
it in e-mail to me, it “was an obvious application which could be done in a short
time using simple temporal relations and forms of inference which were pedestrian by
comparison to those with which the temporal logic group is familiar”. After an initial
failure to specify, the mathematicians asked Robertson, with some embarrassment, to
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write a prototype for them. He rapidly turned out a Prolog program, of less than 100
lines of the kind that a bright second year undergraduate should be able to write. This
prototype proved to be enough of a trigger, and the mathematicians are now happily
turning out speci*cations of more complex systems.
The mathematicians simply could not take the *rst step without something concrete
to help them. Robertson believes that the diFculty was that they lacked training in
problem representation. As happens with students who are unable to apply the theory
they learn to problems, the mathematicians had not developed any intuition about
how to abstract away the details of a complicated problem in order to get a useful
speci*cation. Robertson believes that “it is often easier to produce the sort of idealised
system I described above if you are ‘just ignorant enough’ about logic not to be drawn
into too complex modelling at an early stage but ‘just smart enough’ not to make
logical goofs and to be able to transfer the initial prototype to more experienced hands.
People in this line of work need to retain a certain amount of wide-eyed ignorance of
the domain—otherwise they would be tempted to model problems too deeply, which
is fun but seldom pro*table”.
10. Social processes and FMs
It is also my belief that the proper context for FMs in the development of SWICBS
is in the highly social process of requirements engineering. This recalls the 1979
DeMillo et al., paper, “Social Processes and Proofs of Theorems and Programs” [10].
They observed that mathematical proofs work because of the social processes in and
around them that help to ensure that only correct theorems get published; even then they
are not all correct. They argued that the proofs required by FMs applied to program-
ming are generally carried out by grunt mathematicians working alone and without the
bene*t of social interaction, because, unlike publishable proofs in mathematics, proofs
about programs are quite simply and frankly boring. Bored grunt mathematicians make
mistakes. Proofs without social processes are not trustworthy enough for the needs of
systems critical enough to justify the cost of FMs.
The veri*cation community has actually solved this problem by replacing grunt math-
ematicians by theorem proving programs that never get bored and, once they have
matured as programs, never make mistakes. Therefore, today, no one advocating FMs
would even suggest that humans would do any of the veri*cation, except of the most
interesting theorems, for example, which would arise in an intensive study approach,
described in Section 2.2. This solution is not my point. My point is of the necessity
of the social processes and the usefulness of those social processes to a requirements
discovery e2ort. Using theorem proving programs could even reduce the amount of
thinking that the humans on the project do and work against discovery of missing
requirements.
Indeed, inspections as described by Fagan [14], amount to an attempt to inject social
processes into *nding faults in developed software and related documents. Inspections
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set up a bit of a competition between the programmers and the inspectors. The pro-
grammers try their damndest to write code in which the inspectors will fail to *nd
faults, and the inspectors try their damndest to *nd faults in the programmers’ code.
Thus, inspections are fun! Moreover, inspectors are people who are not part of the
development team and are thus, ignoramuses with respect to that development. All
descriptions of inspection of which I am aware stress the importance of the inspectors
not being part of the development team [18,12]. Arndt von Staa reminds us that in-
dependent veri*cation and validation (IV&V) teams are no more than collections of
ignoramuses, with respect to the development itself, whose duty is to *nd Vaws in the
development. Their independence and thus, ignorance, is considered essential for their
success.
11. Hawthorne e1ect
Ric Hehner o2ered another possible explanation for the FMs success stories, at least
those involving an FMs expert joining a real project in an experimental application
of some FM. A study performed in the 1930s in Hawthorne, Illinois showed that the
mere act of studying individual behavior can impact it. A participant in an experimental
application of an FM may try harder, even if he or she is not the FMs expert, and
succeed simply because he or she is in an experiment and is being observed. This
observation suggests turning all SWICBS developments into experimental applications
of FMs, by supplying to each development project a newly graduated FMs expert
itching to try out his or her favorite FM on a real project. Of course, there may not
be enough FMs experts to go around!
12. Conclusions
It is my belief that FMs work when they work, not so much because of formality,
but rather because of
1. what is learned when applying FMs that can be applied in the next round of devel-
opment and
2. the nature of the people who willingly and enthusiastically apply FMs.
Despite the weakness of FMs at discovering new requirements, FMs work best when
they are being applied to the RE stage of SWICBS development to help understand
and correct the requirements.
Probably, the most important implication of the observations in this paper is a bet-
ter approach to convincing industry to routinely apply FMs in the development of
SWICBSs. Heretofore, we have tried to sell FMs by showing that applying FMs yields
signi*cant quality improvements even though the development costs may increase and
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by showing that the increased FM-induced costs are in fact less than the sum of the
original development costs without FMs plus the maintenance costs that are avoided by
the use of FMs. Perhaps industry is so used to considering maintenance costs as costs
to develop the next version, which are necessary anyway, that it does not see the cost
reduction as a bene*t. Perhaps, we should be selling FMs as a way to entice top-notch
thinkers, superabstracters, smart ignoramuses, FMs experts, to join their development
projects. Good managers know that personnel quality has a far bigger impact on a
development project than any technology, such as a development method [6].
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